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Purpose of this paper   The aim of this paper is to illustrate the ways in which contemporary 
organisations are imposing their own private sanctions on fraudsters.  
 
Design/methodology The research draws on primary data from interviews with counter fraud 
practitioners in the UK, secondary sources and case examples.  
 
Findings  Such developments have been stimulated, at least in part, by the broader 
limitations of the criminal justice system and in particular a ‘fraud 
bottleneck’. Alongside criminal sanctions, many examples were provided of 
organisations employing private prosecutions innovative forms of civil 
sanction and ‘pseudo state’ sanctions, most commonly civil penalties 
comparable to fines.  
Research limitations  Such changes could mark the beginning of the ‘rebirth of private 
prosecution’ and the further expansion of private punishment. Growing 
private involvement in state sanctions and the development of private 
sanctions represents a risk to traditional guarantees of justice. There are 
differences in which comparable frauds are dealt with by corporate bodies 
and thus considerable inconsistency in sanctions imposed. In contrast with 
criminal justice measures, there is no rehabilitative element to private 
sanctions. More research is needed to assess the extent of such measures, 
and establish what is happening, the wider social implications, and whether 
greater state regulation is needed.  
 
What is original/ 
Value of paper  The findings are of relevance to criminal justice policy makers, academics 
and counter fraud practitioners in the public and private sectors  
 
 
Article Type: Research paper  
Implications for practice:  
• Private sanctions for fraud are likely to continue to grow, as organisations pursue their own 
measures rather than relying on increasingly over-stretched criminal justice systems.  
• Their emergence, extent and implications are not fully understood by researchers and therefore 
need much more research, consideration and debate.  
 These private measures need to be more actively recognised by criminal justice policy 
makers and analysts alongside the already substantial formal involvement of the private 
sector in punishment through prisons, electronic tagging and probation, for example.  
 
  Such measures lack the checks and balances, and greater degree of consistency as laid out 
in sentencing guidelines, of the criminal justice system. In light of this, consideration needs 
to be given to greater state regulation of private sanctions for fraud. 
 
 More also needs to be done to help fraudsters suffering problems such as debt or addiction 
to rebuild their lives. There is a strong case for measures beyond the criminal justice system 
to support such fraudsters to be created and publicly promoted.  
  
Introduction 
The emergence of ‘private policing’ has become a subject of great interest amongst policy 
makers, researchers and academics. A variety of issues have been explored, including the  
agents and bodies involved, their culture, their legal powers, their regulation and the social  
implications of their expansion (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983, 1987; South, 1988;  
Johnston, 1992; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Loader and Walker, 2001, 2007; Rigakos, 2002;  
Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; Crawford, Lister and Blackburn, 2005;  
Button, 2007, 2011; Sarre and Prenzler, 2009; White, 2010). Empirical studies have shown  
the substantial contribution that the private sector makes to policing internationally in  
terms of numbers and roles (Shearing, Farnell and Stenning, 1980; Jones and Newburn,  
1998; Prenzler, Sarre and Earle, 2008; Confederation of European Security Services, 2011;  
Nalla and Wakefield, 2014).  
 
There has also been interest in the privatisation of policing (South, 1988; Johnston, 1992;  
Prenzler, 2004; Wakefield and Button, 2014) and punishment (James, Bottomley, Liebling  
and Clare, 1997; Sarre, 2001; Mehigan and Rowe, 2007; Shefer and Liebling, 2008; Genders,  
2013; Fitzgibbon and Lea, 2014; Ludlow, 2014, 2015). However, interest in the privatisation  
of punishment has tended to focus upon those areas of the state in which direct  
government policy has led to a transfer of function from the public to the private or  
voluntary sector, most commonly in relation to prisons, prisoner escort, custody suites and  
probation. Johnston (1992) associated such developments in UK public policy, many of which have  
been mirrored internationally, with a ‘privatisation mentality’ that began under Margaret Thatcher’s  
Conservative government in the 1980s. These amount to what Johnston (1992) would have  
described as ‘direct load shedding’ and ‘contracting out’, whereby the state has deliberately shed  
roles to the private sector and moved other  traditionally state services to private contractors. Such  
initiatives can also be linked to the concept within the governmentality literature of  
‘responsibilization’, a process in which the state has ‘passed back’ governance roles that it had  
previously absorbed to the private and voluntary sectors, including policing and crime prevention  
functions (O’Malley, 1992; Garland, 1996, O’Malley, 2009).   
 
In The Rebirth of Private Policing, Johnston (1992) also describes a process of ‘indirect load  
shedding’, whereby the state, unable to meet public or corporate expectations, is gradually  
replaced by the private sector filling the gap. Such initiatives have been well documented  
with regard to areas of policing, such as the patrol of public streets, where the state has not  
supplied the presence expected. A number of UK studies have exemplified how the private  
sector (with varying degrees of support from state bodies) has been able to offer this service  
in residential areas, with the local communities willing to pay for that gap to be filled  
(McManus, 1995; Noaks, 2000; Sharp and Wilson, 2000; Crawford et al., 2005).  Discussion  
of such trends is developed from an Australian perspective by Prenzler (2004) and a North  
American viewpoint by Brodeur (2010).  
 
An area in which there has been less academic interest is the ‘indirect load shedding’ of  
punishment, although a number of studies have recognised this as occurring with respect to  
fraud and started to consider its implications. Some three decades ago, Levi (1987, p.183)  
described prosecution as the ‘control method of the last resort’ in relation to fraud cases in  
the UK, due to their complexity and expense. He went on to observe that cuts to police  
resources for the investigation of serious fraud, which was already being de-prioritised at  
that time in relation to other crimes, shifted ‘the economic burden of crime investigation  
onto victims, especially corporate victims … and has thus transferred public law back into  
the sphere of private law’ (p.282). Levi, and later Doig and Macaulay (2008), detailed some  
of the ways in which UK public sector agencies address fraud without involving the police,  
with the active encouragement of the Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts (PAC)  
and the National Audit Office (NAO), by means of their own investigations and criminal prosecutions  
as well as other forms of sanction. Sarre (2001) considered the implications of  
using civil and administrative sanctions, as opposed to the criminal law, in relation to a  
number of areas of criminality, but particularly corporate crime and fraud. The advantages  
that he noted included efficiency and cost effectiveness, while he also highlighted  
disadvantages associated with fewer rights for defendants, greater inconsistency in their  
application, lower visibility and lack of deterrence.  
 
This paper contributes to this small but important body of literature by looking more closely  
at corporate responses to the punishment of fraud across the private, public and voluntary  
sectors, and building on Sarre’s work to consider the social implications of these responses.  
Drawing on recent empirical research and legal cases, it will show how the inability of the  
state to provide for effective criminal sanctions, combined with the desire of many private  
organisations for a different approach to punishment, is fuelling a growing private  
involvement in the pursuit and delivery of sanctions. Its extent is such that the corporate  
sector could be said to be developing a private sanctions framework beyond the state  
infrastructure. The state has been largely agnostic to such initiatives so far in relation to the  
private sector, and as such they cannot be viewed as a form of ‘responsibilization’ – where  
state encouragement is required. However, they might be viewed as a form of ‘self 
responsibilization’ (a concept that has already been raised in a limited way by Yesil, 2006,  
vis-à-vis video surveillance), whereby organisations are reclaiming responsibility from the  
state when it no longer supports their needs and deciding to take responsibility for  
punishment themselves. Such conditions are not new, as prior to the formation of the  
modern police in 1829 (and for some time afterwards), private prosecution was the norm  
amongst private entities (Johnston, 1992). The initiatives to be described in this paper may,  
therefore, represent the ‘rebirth of private prosecution’, and prosecution in a much broader  
sense of criminal, civil and private sanctions. This represents an additional dimension to the  
already substantial and growing involvement in private punishment through prisons, tagging  
and probation.   
 
This paper will illustrate this ‘self-responsibilization’ or ‘indirect load shedding’ of  
punishment in relation to fraud. It will outline the methodology and then present the  
findings, starting by examining corporate victims in context, before illustrating the macro  
conditions and in particular the ‘fraud bottleneck’ that have stimulated such developments The  
paper will then outline some of the initiatives that organisations are pursuing in order  
to fill the gap in their punishment needs. In the conclusion the paper will discuss some of  
the broader implications of these changes, building on the considerations highlighted by  
Sarre (2001).   
 
Methodology  
This paper draws on the data from a wider research project looking at organisational  
responses to fraud which involved 39 semi-structured interviews (including five conducted  
over the telephone). The participants (listed in Figure 1) were practitioners from a variety of  
public, private and voluntary bodies, from junior to senior, and with some form of counter  
fraud role. Some of the sectors that were represented included banking, retailing, insurance,  
building supplies, local government, the National Health Service (NHS), a public transport  
authority and trade associations. The interviews were also targeted at bodies providing  
services to organisations to deal with fraud such as the police, Crown Prosecution Service  
(CPS), firms of accountants, lawyers and a private investigator. Some of the telephone  
interviews related to bodies involved in the investigation and prosecution of healthcare  
fraud in the United States, where it had been suggested there was innovative use of  
sanctions.  
 
All five authors undertook interviews with reference to an interview schedule based around  
a standard set of topics. Among these, participants were asked about their experience of the  
following, in each case with reference to a common set of prompts:  
 
• Criminal prosecution with official body (CPS, SFO, SOLP)  
• Criminal private prosecution   
• Civil litigation   
• Staff disciplinary procedures  
• Use of official regulatory body where possible 
 • Parallel sanctions   
• Other examples of sanctions: UK or overseas  
 
One of the themes that emerged from the research was the diverse and growing range of  
private sector sanctions deployed to deal with fraud in the absence of an adequate state  
response. This paper draws upon interview data, documentary material secured during the  
project and legal cases, as well as other secondary data.     
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
Findings  
Corporate Victims in Context  
Over the last two decades there has been a substantial increase in research on victims of  
crime and an increasing pre-occupation with their needs among policy-makers (Walklate,  
2007a, 2007b). This has been accompanied by a growing punitive orientation among the  
public and political elites in many Western countries (Garland, 2001; Roberts, Stalans,  
Indemaur and Hough, 2003). On the other hand, organisations as victims, whether in the  
public, private or voluntary sectors, have been largely neglected by researchers.  Rather,  
under the auspices of ‘white collar crime’, the focus has invariably been upon the corporate  
body as the offender, rather than the victim (Braithwaite, 1984; Croall, 2007; Whyte, 2007;  
Snell and Tombs, 2011). While there can be little doubt that there is extensive criminal  
behaviour by corporate bodies, which in most jurisdictions does not receive the attention it  
deserves, organisations are victims of crime too.  
 
One of the most common crimes they experience is fraud by employees, suppliers,  
customers and the general population (Levi, 2008). Indeed, in monetary terms it is one of  
the most – if not the most – expensive crimes to society. In an international survey by the  
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2014), it was estimated that a typical organization  
loses five per cent of its annual revenue each year to fraud. The average value of a fraud  
was $145,000, while just over a fifth of cases involved losses of at least $1 million, and the  
projected global annual fraud loss was nearly $3.7 trillion. In the UK the National Fraud  
Indicator showed a £52 billion estimated loss in 2012, of which the vast majority can be  
attributed to private and public organisations (National Fraud Authority, 2013).  
Research exploring the sanctions that organisations use when targeted has, however, been  
limited (see Levi, 1987; 1992; 2002; Bussmann and Werle, 2006). One of the few studies  
that provides clues on a global scale is a somewhat dated international survey of 5,500  
companies by Bussmann and Werle (2006). They found that only 51 per cent of cases (both  
internal and external) led to a criminal charge. Distinct differences were also noted between  
regions, with Asian companies being much less likely to bring criminal charges (only 26 per  
cent) or terminate employment (68 per cent), and other measures, such as redeployment  
and warning and indeed doing nothing (16 per cent), being common options.   
There has also been a small body of research looking at corporate bodies as forms of  
governance, examining their internal systems for dealing with deviance, although this has  
been much broader than fraud and crime more generally (see  Shearing and Stenning, 1982;  
Macauley, 1986; Ayers and Braithwaite, 1995; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). There has,  
however, been little interest in some of the innovative and most importantly private ways in  
which corporate bodies are now developing to deal with fraud (as well as some other types  
of problems). The matter of fraud provides an ideal case study for examining some of these  
changes. First, it is a major problem to corporate bodies usually in cost and volume of  
offences (National Fraud Authority, 2013). Second, it is an area in which state resources are  
thin and, as a consequence, there have been a variety of private initiatives to fill the gap  
emerging. Before we start to examine these, the methods for this project will be outlined.   
 
The Fraud ‘Bottleneck’ in the Criminal Justice System. 
  
Fraud is a major problem to the UK economy, with £20.2 billion of the £52 billion cost  
attributed to the private sector (National Fraud Authority, 2013). Millions of cases of fraud  
every year are perpetrated against the corporate sector. Many of these are undetected, but  
there are still many cases that are detected. When frauds are discovered by corporate  
bodies, it is notable that the range of responses employed extends well beyond those of the  
criminal justice system. With many internal frauds, the embarrassment and bad publicity  
that the criminal justice system could potentially bring are one reason why public  
prosecution may not be sought. Criminal trials often invite media interest and internal  
frauds often expose poor practices, such as staff incompetence or transgression, and poor  
supervision. However, even if a corporate body does want to pursue a criminal prosecution,  
there are a variety of factors that create a ‘bottleneck’, making it difficult for them to  
achieve that aim.  
 
The police in general devote few resources to fraud and there are less than 700 specialist  
fraud police officers in the whole of the UK (Button, Blackbourn and Tunley, 2014). This fact,  
and the lack of political will that lies behind it, can be put into context when one considers  
the 3000+ counter fraud specialists employed by the UK’s Department for Work and  
Pensions to address the specific problem of benefit fraud (Button et al., 2014). For many  
organisations – particularly small and medium sized enterprises – they simply do not have  
the capacity to launch a criminal investigation (whether it is staff with the skills or resources  
to hire external investigators). This means that they rely on police interest which, given their  
resources, is often hard to secure (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2012). Even if an organisation does  
have the capacity to investigate to a criminal standard, it still requires the support of the  
police (or other state investigative body) for the case to be accepted and passed on to the  
prosecutors. Police interest may also be required in order to secure access to their powers  
of arrest and search. As such, the police represent the gatekeepers to the criminal justice  
system, but because of the resources and attitudes of some, it is often difficult to obtain  
their interest, as the quote from one interview illustrates:   
 
(in) this day and age, and I worked in London, and you try and report something to 
the police and you say, "I've had £4,000 nicked." And they say, "Yeah, what do you 
want me to do about it then?" "Well you're the police ain't you?" "£4,000, take it on 
the chin mate." Building Society Fraud Investigator (Head of Department). 
 
In another interview the long road to justice in some cases that do secure interest was  
illustrated:   
 
I had another case, it was a middle manager. Daft at it seems, he was using petty 
cash to pay his lifestyle, pay wages of non-existent employees and that sort of thing. 
The point was the company was in the Midlands, the manager had a branch in Exeter 
or something. He had to go to the local police and they didn't have a fraud squad 
and the guy in Exeter was an operational detective and he took on the fraud, but it 
took him six months, nine months to get round to it because every time he came on 
duty there was work to do here, work to do there on something else, there was a 
rape or a murder or a robbery or whatever. So although that guy was willing, keen 
and able he didn't have the opportunity to be able to do it. Private Investigator. 
 
The position of the police was summed up by one Detective Sergeant from an Economic  
Crime Team:   
 
[the Economic Crime Team] it’s almost like the sickly child, you know, 
undernourished and under resourced by comparison with more high profile 
departments.  So, you have an issue, there, where demand … resourcing does not 
match potential demand, so … I don’t think there is that confidence with the current 
resourcing that we can adequately … we do secure many very, very good 
convictions, but there is that continuing unease ... Police Detective Region 2. 
 
The police, however, are but the first part of the bottleneck. The next is the Crown  
Prosecution Service (CPS). Some corporate bodies who secure police interest have the case  
referred to the CPS, who then decide not to continue with the case. Some private bodies  
have even gone direct to the CPS, as one interviewee who was a CPS lawyer noted:   
 
Occasionally, people will come to us direct and we always explain the difference 
between the role of the investigator, the role of the prosecutor and refer them back 
to the police and, usually, they’ve been to the police already and they’re coming to 
us because they haven’t had any joy there. CPS Lawyer Local. 
 
Unlike many state bodies (such as the Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue and  
Customs and the NHS) which have developed extensive criminal investigation resources and  
capacity for their own prosecutions or sections within the CPS, private bodies do not have  
these luxuries (Button, 2011). There is therefore a ‘gap’ that has emerged between the  
demand for criminal sanctions and the capacity of the police to supply these. In such a  
vacuum, corporate bodies have been developing a variety of mechanisms to sanction  
fraudsters. In the private sector, however, there is also the strong influence of financial  
matters, as one consultant providing services to both noted:   
 
Speed of response, corporates want things doing absolutely immediately because 
the bottom line matters more in corporates. In the public sector they are very keen 
to see justice done so they would prefer to see somebody put in prison and forget 
the money has actually gone somewhere and they don’t need the money, whereas 
corporates couldn't give a toss what happened to the person, prison or not prison 
and would actually prefer not to because of the reputational damage. They are far 
more interested in, the first question is, "Can you get my money back?" Counter 
Fraud Consultant 2. 
 
Numerous studies have noted the variety of employer imposed sanctions used by corporate  
bodies, including reprimand, taking away privileges, reduced pay through a variety of  
measures, and dismissal (Macauley, 1986; Goldstraw-White, 2012; Meerts, 2014; Weiss,  
2014). These are not controversial. However, as this paper will show, for some corporate  
bodies these, combined with the absence of a state response, have not satisfied their desire  
for an effective sanction. As a consequence, a variety of private prosecution and private  
sanctions have emerged on top of these traditional sanctions, which will now be explored.   
Filling the Gap  
 
Many private sector bodies have been finding new means to sanction fraudsters, some of  
which use state structures, while others employ new privately developed structures. It is  
important to note that generalisation is difficult as the use of such measures varies  
considerably within the private sector.  
 
Criminal sanctions remain attractive to many private organisations, providing the ultimate  
deterrent to other potential fraudsters. Initiating criminal proceedings can also bring the  
perpetrator to the negotiating table (Williams, 2014), as one interviewee noted:   
 
The Chief Exec had suspected that the Finance Director was messing about with the 
funds. He did not know what was happening but he knew there was a big hole in the 
accounts. That was as much as he knew, so we sent in one of our investigators and 
one of our forensic accountants when he wasn't in, on a Friday…. It was such an easy 
one to spot because we just went straight into his internet activity and he was doing 
online bingo, constantly. I mean a bloke, online bingo. He spent over £700,000 of the 
company's money on online bingo at work. By the Sunday afternoon we had actually 
got his house signed over. We had gone round to see him and basically said, "This is 
ugly, could go to the police." And he just said, "OK" and literally signed over his 
house to the company. Counter Fraud Consultant 2. 
 
However, it is also clear that among some sections of commerce there is an appetite for  
new measures in the knowledge that the traditional state centred approach cannot satisfy  
their needs. As one investigator from the financial services sector succinctly summed up:   
  
We've got to the point where we have given up with the police. Building Society 
Fraud Investigator (Head of Department). 
 
Some organisations have therefore sought to develop their own means to guarantee that  
criminal prosecution is on the negotiating table, most notably through private prosecution.   
  
Private prosecutions   
 
The right to pursue a private prosecution in England and Wales is set out in section 6 of the  
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (see Lewis, Brooks, Button, Shepherd and Wakefield,  
2014, in relation to fraud). There is evidence of growing interest and use of private  
prosecution. There has been media coverage exposing the willingness of companies such as  
Virgin Media to pursue private prosecutions and high profile cases such as  the conviction of  
Kenyan businessman Ketan Somaia for a $19.5 million fraud by private prosecution in 2014   
(Dodd, 2014; Croft, 2014). There are also law firms that have emerged offering this service,  
such as Edward Hayes and one firm, Edmunds Marshall McMahon, specialising purely in  
private prosecutions for corporate victims (Edmunds Marshall McMahon, 2015). Ernst and  
Young, one of the major accountancy firms, has also launched a private prosecution service  
for clients in 2014 in partnership with Peters and Peters Solicitors (Croft and Binham, 2014).  
Some corporate victims have turned to firms such as these when there has been police  
interest, but the CPS has declined to prosecute. For example, two interviewees from two  
different anti-piracy bodies both claimed the CPS had been reluctant to take forward some  
cases of copyright infringement related crimes, but corporate willingness to fund a private  
prosecution had encouraged the police to remain involved when possible CPS non 
involvement may have reduced their commitment to remain involved. In other cases the  
organisation had been determined to secure what they regarded as a far more effective  
sanction despite the lack of CPS interest. The case of one anti-piracy unit head who used a  
private prosecution illustrates this:   
… and all that happened, every time they got served with some civil letters, they 
folded, moved off and set up a new company in a false name. So they were spending  
a fortune constantly trying to redo it, and send people after them. And one of them  
got chatting to me, and I said, 'why don't we just go criminally?' It's absolutely a clear  
criminal case; let's just arrest them for conspiracy to defraud. So again, engaged with  
local law enforcement, they were arrested for that, convicted at court and also with  
the Proceeds of Crime [Act], so double whammy. I think he got three years or three  
and a half years, so a substantial sentence. Anti-Piracy Unit 3 Head.   
 
It is difficult to determine the extent of private prosecutions in England and Wales, because  
no statistics are kept by the CPS. Given that Edmunds Marshall McMahon was only  
established in 2012, there have not been significant numbers prior to this, but the formation  
of such firms and other significant entrances to the market illustrates that this is an area  
that may begin to grow. However, it is clear that private prosecution is growing as an option  
amongst corporate bodies.   
 
The privatisation of prosecution raises some interesting issues for debate. The constitutional  
division between the prosecutor and investigator in criminal cases is much cherished. This  
becomes blurred when the client becomes the paymaster for both. There is of course the  
right of the state to take over a private prosecution and discontinue it, which happened to  
Edmunds Marshall McMahon on one occasion (Edmonds and McMahon, 2014). However, if  
such cases expand, it remains to be seen how adequate such measures will be and whether  
the CPS will be able to cope if there are large numbers of private prosecutions occurring.   
  
Innovative civil sanctions   
 
The use of the civil justice system by corporate victims is another important tool, which  
provides for an option in parallel to criminal proceedings or quite often alone (Meerts and  
Dorn, 2009; Meerts, 2014). The lawyers specialising in civil fraud interviewed for this  
research all noted that many corporate bodies will use the civil process to secure  
recompense and compensation from the perpetrator, particularly when they hold assets  
such as property, investments or a pension fund. Cases pursued through the civil courts also  
enable a wide range of orders to be granted which can act as sanctions (such as freezing a  
bank account or confiscating a passport) and powers for the purposes of an investigation  
(such as searches). The way statistics are compiled by the Ministry of Justice means exact  
figures are impossible to secure. It is clear that there are thousands of such cases every  
year, most settled out of court, and that this is still a significant and especially common  
private sanction open to corporate victims to pursue for large fraud losses.   
 
Some corporate bodies also pursue regulatory sanctions against fraudsters. Fraudsters who  
work in roles where they  require an official licence to operate, such as accountants, lawyers  
and surveyors, are often pursued through their regulatory bodies with the aim of having  
them ‘struck off’ as a means of sanction, which also serves as a tactic to bring the culprit to  
the negotiating table. The extent of such sanctions, however, is difficult to determine.  
 
One area of the civil law that has been utilised very innovatively by some insurance  
company victims relates to contempt of court (Button and Brooks, 2014). There are two  
categories of contempt of court, criminal and civil. The criminal form is concerned with  
direct contempt of court involving, for example, interrupting Crown Court proceedings,  
threatening witnesses or disobeying court orders. Civil contempt is usually concerned with  
the failure to comply with court orders and is a means to enforce remedies such as  
injunctions or compensation orders. The civil form is quasi-criminal in nature as the penalty  
is up to two years’ imprisonment and the burden of proof is to the criminal standard,  
beyond reasonable doubt. An unusual feature of the offence is that it is not tried before a  
jury.  
 
A particular species of civil contempt has been gaining momentum over the last few years in  
dealing with insurance fraud. The Civil Procedure Rule 32.14 provides that:  
 
Proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person if he makes, or 
causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth  
without an honest belief in its truth (Ministry of Justice, 2015).  
 
The landmark case sparking this tool for insurers was Joanne Kirk v Carol Walton [2008]  
EWHC 1780 and [2009] EWHC 703 (QB). In this case, Joanne Kirk claimed that an accident in  
which her car experienced a rear end shunt had triggered health complaints leading to the  
inability to walk more than ten yards, and caused her to have to give up work. She initially  
claimed for £800,000 but eventually settled for £25,000 compensation, which she received.  
The insurers in this case, RBS, commissioned private investigators to put Kirk under  
surveillance and secured footage of her walking, shopping and driving. As a result, they  
sought grounds to bring contempt proceedings against her for ‘making false statements’.  
The case was heard in March 2009 and she was found in contempt on two grounds of lying  
in court documents. Her penalty was to pay for her legal bill of £125,000, half the  
defendant’s legal costs and a £2500 fine (Guildhall Chambers, 2015).      
 
In another case, Nield v Loveday [2011] EWHC 2324, Acromas Insurance used the contempt  
of court route. A couple had sought to claim substantial personal injury damages for a car  
accident. The claim was shown to be fraudulent and Acromas, through the law firm Keoghs,  
brought successful contempt of court proceedings leading to a nine month prison sentence  
for the husband and six months suspended for 18 months for the wife (Keoghs, 2011). It is  
very difficult to estimate the total number of these types of case, as there are no clear  
statistics published and not all cases may be reported by the media. However, it is clear that  
this is becoming a service actively promoted by some firms, as the following extract from an  
article by a Director at solicitors DWF reveals:     
 
As well as providing a remedy for fabricated incidents … contempt proceedings are 
an ideal remedy for exaggerated claims, which currently fall outside the acceptance 
criteria for IFED [Insurance Fraud Enforcement Bureau], the specialist police unit 
dedicated to tackling insurance fraud. 
 
It goes on to state,  
 
The days when dishonest claimants who are found out can simply walk away from 
their actions are over.  Procedures are in place to enable fraudsters to be punished 
and our experienced specialists are ready to use them. Delay is the enemy in this 
jurisdiction. The process is quick and relatively inexpensive and it is difficult to 
imagine a more potent counter fraud message to send fraudsters than they risk 
losing their freedom. (Palmer, 2012) 
 
It is difficult to determine the extent of this sanction because the Ministry of Justice does  
not keep statistics linked to this species of contempt. However, searches through the media  
coverage of insurers and lawyers would suggest that there have been dozens of cases since  
the Kirk case. The small number might lead one to consider it as not being significant.  
  
However, the development of this sanction poses some interesting issues for debate. It  
provides for the potential for serious criminal-like penalties without some of the  
fundamental guarantees of criminal courts, such as trial by jury.  As with private  
prosecution, the divisions between investigation and prosecution that occur in the criminal  
arena also become blurred in contempt cases. Insurers effectively assume both roles, as the  
clients with the resources and ability to task their legal and investigation teams to pursue  
proceedings.  Unlike private prosecutions, however, there is no scope for the state to take  
over cases to discontinue them.    
  
‘Pseudo state’ sanctions   
 
The sanctions gap has also created the development of what could be described as ‘pseudo  
state’ sanctions since they are comparable to some state sanctions. The most common are  
civil penalties which compare to fines. Civil penalties have become particularly popular in  
the retail sector for shoplifting as well as some fraud related offences (Bamfield, 2012;  
Citizen Advice, 2009). Under these schemes, instead of an offender being pursued in the  
criminal courts, culprits are issued with a letter seeking compensation for the goods stolen  
and time taken by the organisation to investigate the matter. Another area in which such  
approaches have been used is against those suspected of downloading music illegally. The  
law firm ACS: Law secured much publicity when, on behalf of MediaCAT, it began issuing  
thousands of civil penalty letters to individuals suspected of downloading music illegally,  
demanding £500 or the prospect of court action (Wakefield, 2011). Many of those receiving  
letters claimed to be innocent and the firm eventually stopped doing this, while the  
managing partner of the firm faced disciplinary action from the Solicitors Regulatory  
Authority. There has also been criticism of those using these measures for demanding  
payments well in excess of the actual loss, as well as for targeting minors (Citizen Advice,  
2009).   
 
There are a variety of fraudster databases that could be compared to the UK’s state run  
Violent and Sex Offender Register, but which are managed by private sector consortiums.  
They are often marketed as ‘preventative tools’ rather than punishment, but they do have  
implications for individuals listed on the register, as has been noted in research on more  
illicit blacklists (Whyte, 2015). The consequences of being placed on these fraudster lists  
include greater difficulties in securing employment and/or costs in gaining financial  
products, and therefore must be seen as a form of punishment. For example, an individual  
placed upon the Insurance Fraud Register might find it difficult to secure motor insurance or  
the costs may become prohibitive, making lawful driving impossible for many.  There are a  
number of bodies holding databases with details of individuals convicted of, dismissed from  
employment for, or suspected of fraud, some of the most prominent of which are listed in  
Figure 1. These vary in their coverage and the criteria for individuals included upon them.  
For example, the Staff Fraud Database maintained by CIFAS (a membership association for  
fraud prevention, formerly known as the Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance Service) has the  
following criteria for inclusion on its database:   
 
Factual Accuracy and Standard of Proof  
In order to file a staff fraud record, the information must be factually correct and  
accurate. A member filing such information can only do so if it has good reason to  
believe it has or could have suffered loss, and/or it reasonably believes that it has  
grounds to press criminal charges for fraud or the commission of any other offence if  
a suspect were traced. This means that in all cases, members MUST be prepared to  
make a formal complaint to the police or other relevant law enforcement agency.  
Members must have carried out checks of sufficient depth to satisfy this standard of  
proof (and must retain a record of the checks). The criminal offence must be  
identifiable (Personal Communication from CIFAS).  
 
In general, the administrators of these schemes argue that they are fraud prevention tools,  
enabling their corporate users to prevent ‘known fraudsters’ gaining employment or access  
to their services. They do, however, have consequences for those registered on such  
databases, who may find it more difficult to access services such as credit, financial products  
or insurance, or secure a job.  Indeed, the Insurance Fraud Register has been upfront about  
the sanctions element to the scheme, noting in its launch statement:   
 
It is up to each individual insurer to decide how the information on the register is 
used; there is no common approach agreed across the industry; each insurer is at 
liberty to adopt its own approach. Insurers may wish to apply special terms to 
proven fraudsters, decline to accept them as new customers or decline to invite 
renewal of a product. Proven insurance fraudsters will find it harder to buy new 
products and to renew their existing products. They may also find it more difficult to 
obtain other financial services, including loans and mortgages (Out-Law.Com, 2012). 
 
Little is known about the quality of the decision-making and the potential to review  
decisions which are wrong.  Most would regard the inclusion of those who have been  
convicted of fraud in court as uncontentious, but the vast majority of these entries are  
decided by the member organisation with no reference to an official court decision. The  
question can also be raised as to what happens when someone makes a genuine mistake or  
omits information in the rush of a credit application and, as a consequence, is added to one  
of these databases based upon the decision of the corporate body with no opportunity for  
the ‘fraudster’ to challenge the decision. Indeed, in 2014 a case was highlighted of a man  
who failed to notify his mortgage lender that he was letting some of his spare rooms and, as  
a consequence, was placed on the CIFAS fraudster database on the grounds of ‘application  
fraud and mortgage property misuse’ (Mikhailova, 2014).   
 
In another case in 2012 the BBC’s Money Box programme highlighted the case of a student  
who had been placed on the CIFAS fraudster database for ‘first party fraud’ by mistake, and  
who as a consequence had his existing bank accounts closed and was unable to open  
another account. The student complained, ‘I was made to go to the counter and clear my  
account in cash. You feel like a criminal when you're marched over and marched out the  
door without being given any reason as to why your account is being closed’ (BBC News,  
2012). Only his father’s intervention and investigation skills saved him as he was able to  
prove it was the bank’s mistake. The Chair of the then Financial Services Authority’s  
Consumer Panel, commented upon the case, ‘You cannot find out what you're accused of,  
you cannot plead your case and you find yourself unable to open a bank account and  
nothing can be done about it. What's happening goes absolutely against the rules of natural  
justice’ (BBC News, 2012).  
 
The implications for an individual in their access to a range of services, securing a job and  
the plain label of ‘fraudster’ could be significant. In short, the definitions of a fraudster and  
determining who is labelled as such are becoming privatised and fragmented with corporate  
bodies determining the definitions and decisions with no reference to the state. There are a  
variety of definitions of what constitutes fraud, different levels of proof and multiple bodies  
presiding over the decisions. The consequence is a corporate sector that, in effect, has  
created its own system for determining and sanctioning fraudsters, operating on a mass  
scale. As Figure 2 illustrates, some of these databases contain hundreds of thousands of  
entries. Such measures may also represent a form of shaming in a manner that brings  
stigma rather than being ultimately re-integrative, as Braithwaite (1989) viewed the process  
of criminal sanction.    
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
Discussion   
 
[There was] little or no attempt at criminal detection. Crime was brought to the 
courts when victims prosecuted offenders. Officials did not go out to find it. Justices 
dealt with the evidence, but detection and apprehension was left to the victims, who 
often went to great lengths to regain stolen property … (Johnston, 1992: 9). 
 
The quote by Johnston above refers to the policing and justice system of the late eighteenth  
and early nineteenth centuries. Those comments could also be applied to many of the  
arrangements in the private sector for dealing with fraud today. The emergence of private  
sector interventions to fill the gap and develop new private solutions amounts to the  
‘indirect load shedding’ of the state or ‘self-responsibilization’ of punishment. To adapt the  
title of Johnston’s book, we could be experiencing the ‘rebirth of private prosecution’ and  
further expansion of private punishment, added to the already substantial involvement of  
the private sector in punishment through prisons, tagging, probation, etc. In the UK, many  
of these changes have only recently occurred. The first contempt of court case for insurance  
fraud was in 2008, the specialist legal practice Edmunds Marshall McMahon was established  
in 2012, and the National Fraud Register in 2012; other initiatives such as the CIFAS Staff  
Fraud Database date back to 1988. As such the life of such measures may be limited;  
because they are so new they may not sustain enough support for them to continue.  
However, given that the underpinning conditions that have caused them are unlikely to go  
away, it seems likely they will continue to grow in the UK, and that this trend could well be  
replicated in other jurisdictions. Their emergence and implications are not fully understood  
by researchers and therefore need much more consideration and debate, building on  
Sarre’s (2001) earlier work relating to civil and administrative responses to crimes more  
generally.  
 
First of all, as Sarre highlighted, the growing range of private involvement in state sanctions  
and the development of private sanctions represent a risk to the traditional guarantees of  
justice. The blurring of investigatory and prosecution decisions under the client’s purse with  
respect to private prosecution and contempt of court measures present a significant risk.  
Justice comes much more under commercial influence and away from an independent  
system built upon separation of powers. The proliferation of private pseudo justice beyond  
the criminal justice system also does not provide for the same checks and balances. At the  
pinnacle is the criminal justice system, with its extensive procedures, standards and  
balanced legal representation, set against a cacophony of other forums or in many cases  
just a decision-maker to determine guilt with very mixed standards of justice. Even the civil  
justice system does not guarantee legal representation for the accused. Some of the other  
sanctions, such as fraudsters’ databases, could be considered as the summary justice of the  
corporate state with little support available to help the defendant. For example, if an  
employee is sacked for a fraud that they dispute and is placed on a fraudster’s register,  
there is no guarantee of support for the accused to defend or challenge such decisions,  
when such a person might be incapable of defending themselves or have no opportunity to  
do so. Inclusion on such lists for many will have significant implications for their lives.    
 
The changes also highlight the clear differences in which comparable frauds are dealt with  
by corporate bodies and the consequent inconsistency in sanctions imposed, a problem also  
recognised by Sarre (2001) with respect to civil and administrative sanctions. Some  
comparable fraudsters may face a significantly different range of sanctions, with some  
facing the traditional criminal justice system, others the civil and pseudo measures and  
others presented with all of these. Consistency in sentencing in the criminal courts has been  
a subject of much debate and reform (Ashworth, 2007; Van Slyke and Bales, 2012).  
However, given the small number of fraud cases that ultimately end up in the criminal  
courts, such initiatives to create sentencing consistency seem futile when so many other  
sanctions are happening around them with no attempt to obtain consistency.   
  
  
Another important implication of the use of non-criminal sanctions is that it signals the  
rejection of rehabilitation. There is much to be debated concerning the commitment and  
effectiveness of such measures within the criminal justice system (Zedner, 2004). But what  
is clear with the use of many of the sanctions described in this paper is the complete  
absence of any interest in rehabilitation. Fraudsters who may have significant personal  
problems that led them to commit fraud are likely to receive no help if they are dealt with  
outside the criminal justice system. Although many such fraudsters may be at low risk of  
reoffending, the rise of the non-criminal infrastructure, built upon situational principles of  
protecting the organisation, not society, does not provide for any rehabilitation. More needs  
to be done to focus on measures to help fraudsters suffering problems such as debt or  
addiction to rebuild their lives. Measures to help such fraudsters need to be created beyond  
the criminal justice system and publicly promoted.    
 
The ‘rebirth of private prosecution’ and the growing addition to the already growing private  
punishment infrastructure, occurring with the ‘self-responsibilization’ of punishment, have  
significant consequences that raise a wide range of issues for debate. It particularly requires  
more research to assess the extent of such measures (on which, as has been noted in this  
article, there is not much data at present), establish what is happening, their wider  
implications for society and, most importantly, whether greater state regulation of them  
needs to occur.   
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Figure 1. Interviewees (with assigned name used) contacted for this research 
Criminal Justice System  
Crown Prosecution Service national  
Crown Prosecution Service local   
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) representative  
Police detective region 1  
Police detective region 2  
Police detective London  
Police detective London  
  
Civil System   
Lawyer specialising in fraud  
Lawyer 2 Bevan Brittan (specifically asked for firm to be named)   
Lawyer 3 Bevan Brittan (specifically asked for firm to be named)  
  
Counter Fraud Bodies  
National Fraud Authority Official   
Anti-fraud NGO chair  
Fraud NGO official  
  
Public Sector   
Public corporation security manager  
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills investigator  
NHS counter fraud specialist  
London Borough counter fraud specialist  
Regional local authority counter fraud specialist  
Trading standards officer   
Transport body security manager 
 
Private Sector   
Counter fraud consultant 1  
Counter fraud consultant 2  
Private investigator (ex-fraud police)  
Building society fraud investigator (ex-fraud police)  
Building supplies manager (business controls and procedures manager)  
Company head (self-investigator)  
High street bank fraud investigator.   
Supermarket head of security  
Media company investigations manager   
  
Other Sectors  
RSPCA prosecutor   
Anti-piracy unit 1 director general  
Anti-piracy unit 2 acting head   
Anti-piracy unit 3 head    
Parking association   
Parking enforcement company  
Retail civil recovery expert  
  
USA   
US federal fraud investigator  
US federal prosecutor east coast   
US federal prosecutor deep south 
 
Figure 2. Fraudster databases 
 
Staff Fraud Databases   
CIFAS Staff Fraud Database   
Contains around 1000 names of individuals who have been convicted of fraud or equivalent  
(see above) who are added by members. Members, over which there are over 160, have  
access to this database and can make entries. This database is largely orientated around  
financial services.   
 
Telecommunications UK Fraud forum (TUFF) Information on Ex-Employees Database   
 
A database covering details of staff of member organisations who have been dismissed for  
theft or fraud.   
 
Fraud Databases   
CIFAS National Fraud Database   
This is a much larger database containing information relating to confirmed and attempted  
frauds largely relating to financial applications (for example for credit, loans or products  
purchased on contract or in instalments). It has over 250,000 records and 250+ member  
organisations.   
 
Experian National Fraud Database   
Contains fraud information relating to addresses, social security numbers, driving licences  
and phone numbers.   
 
National Insurance Fraud Register   
Launched in 2012 and contains information of individuals proven to have committed frauds  
against insurers. 
 
